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French policy toward NATO has long befuddled US policymakers. Bilateral security and defense cooperation between
Washington and Paris has long been cordial, if not intimate. Moreover, relations between the respective armed services
of these two countries have also been close and mutually supportive of common national objectives.[1] However, this
degree of bilateral cooperation has not extended into the multilateral fora of NATO. Paris has long suspected US
motives in the Alliance and harbored perceptions of inadequate political control over NATO's military structures.[2]
This distrust has resulted in obstructionist, if not counterproductive, French policies toward the Alliance. It is little
wonder that US officials have been confused by this seemingly irrational and schizophrenic approach toward an
organization which has provided the very bases for French national security.
In its own way, French Cold War policy toward NATO was logical. It was logical because President Charles de
Gaulle, the architect of French security policy for the 5th Republic, felt that NATO-defined missions could not ensure
civilian control over the military to the degree that nationally defined missions could. De Gaulle's decision to withdraw
from NATO's integrated military structure thus served as the basis for Gaullist defense policy, which continues to
influence strongly French strategy:[3]
firm civilian control over the military, both within France and NATO
an independent strategic nuclear deterrent
substrategic and conventional forces for deterrence and defense in Central Europe and the Mediterranean
intervention forces for out-of-area operations
a sophisticated and technically advanced industrial base to ensure a high degree of independence in nuclear and
conventional force requirements
During the Cold War, the Gaullist legacy offered France the luxury of pursuing a defense policy that supported specific
French national interests, while Washington stationed forces in Germany and kept the Soviet Union out of Western
Europe. Under these circumstances, France maintained an independent distance from NATO, garrisoned forces in
Germany, developed national nuclear forces, and deployed military forces throughout the world in support of French
and Western interests. Paris, in short, had all of the political advantages of an aspiring world power without having to
pay the full political cost associated with NATO membership.[4]
Regrettably for France, this has all changed as recent events have destroyed the comfortable assumptions that
underwrote Gaullist strategy. Pierre Lellouche writes, "The French too are awakening, reluctantly, to a messy Europe,
where most of the basic foreign policy and defense guidelines laid out by General Charles de Gaulle 35 years ago are
simply no longer relevant."[5] Moreover, recent circumstances have unleashed a series of events that have challenged
cherished French political objectives in Europe. German unification ended the long held (indeed, polite) myth of
French leadership in the close Franco-German relationship.[6] The French vision for a deeper European Union (EU)[7]
has effectively been placed on hold while the EU is widened (expanded in membership) with the inclusion of Norway,
Finland, Sweden, and Austria, and, perhaps by the end of the decade, Switzerland and some of the Visegrad states of
Central Europe.[8] Finally, the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and Western Europe's seeming inability
to halt hostilities there, let alone bring about a long-term peace, have made French officials realize that their approach
to dealing with both the United States and NATO needs to be revised.[9]
While these circumstances may be widely known within the US policymaking community, the effects of these new
conditions on French policy toward NATO may be less well understood. The key question about French policy
remains whether its reassessment of NATO reflects changes in policy, attitude, or both. This article argues that altered
regional security conditions have forced French President François Mitterrand to change aspects of French policy

toward NATO. However, lingering atavistic attitudes within certain elements of the French bureaucracy may
complicate the implementation and longevity of these new policies. Indeed, one needs to recognize that
notwithstanding France's newly found interest in participating in NATO consultative fora, structures, programs, and
activities, some French attitudes will not necessarily be all that different, or less difficult for Alliance and US officials
to confront.
Consequently, it is quite likely that American perceptions of French "perfidy" toward NATO will continue in some
measure to impede closer ties with France. Yet, as recent events have demonstrated, French policy toward NATO is
capable of dramatic change (notwithstanding French statements to the contrary) when French national interests so
dictate. An appreciation of the subtle differences in policy and attitude will elucidate actual changes in the content of
French policy, and will indicate how policy will, or will not, be implemented.
Who's Who in Paris
Before examining the details of how and why French policy toward NATO has changed, one needs to review the
elements of the security policymaking community in Paris and consider their complex interactions. For example, even
those relatively familiar with Paris may not fully comprehend how strong an influence domestic politics exert over
French policy toward NATO. And because of the past content and rhetoric of French security policy, many may not be
aware that the United States and NATO enjoy strong support within portions of the French bureaucracy. Few of these
individuals and bureaucracies, however, are at the pinnacle of the French decisionmaking structure.
Presidential Palace (Palais de l'Elysée). Under the Constitution of the 5th Republic, the President of the Republic
need not take counsel of anyone in matters of defense and security policy. Such matters are his exclusively, his
domaine réservé. However, David Yost, a leading expert on French security, has argued that President Mitterrand has
taken a selective interest in defense issues (European, nuclear) and largely has left the administration of the French
armed forces to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.[10] The key result of this condition is that unless the
President makes a specific personal effort to change security policy, inertia prevails. Concerning NATO, Mitterrand's
Gaullist political foes have long painted him as an opponent of the widely popular principles of de Gaulle's defense
and security policy. Thus, Mitterrand may oppose rapprochement with NATO--rejoining the integrated military
command structure,[11] for example--not because of principled opposition to the idea but because he does not want
his legacy to include betrayal of Gaullist security policy.[12]
Foreign Office (Quai d'Orsay). As befits any foreign ministry, the Quai attempts to dominate foreign and security
policy. Thus, whenever the President and his advisors are not actively engaged in initiating or overseeing a change in
policy, the Quai reigns supreme in the implementation of foreign and security policy. Moreover, the Quai is extremely
powerful: it is staffed by graduates of the Grandes Ecoles, whose stature is unequalled by graduates of any other
French or European university. Perhaps more important for dominating the security and defense bureaucracy, the Quai
is the agency charged with receiving and distributing (or not distributing as the case may be) official communications
received from outside of France.
Special internal political considerations also contribute to the Quai's bureaucratic preeminence in security policy. De
Gaulle perceived that NATO's integrated command structure lacked sufficient political oversight. Intent on maintaining
tight civilian control over the military, de Gaulle and his successors have relied on the Quai to ensure close scrutiny
over security policy. Consequently, the Quai traditionally has fought vociferously against French participation in the
Alliance's military structures.[13] To put it diplomatically, the Quai is suspicious of NATO, and makes its concern
known at every opportunity.
Ministry of Defense (Hôtel de Brienne). As a consequence of the Gaullist objective of ensuring civil control over
the military, the Ministry of Defense has long had scant influence in the formulation of national strategy and security
policy. As a result, it historically has operated at a disadvantage in the interagency policy formulation process, a
situation compounded by the presence of a cadre of politico-military and security affairs experts in the Foreign
Ministry. Thus, despite the fact that many military and civilian officials have long wished for closer ties to NATO,
change has been precluded by the relative weakness of the Hotel de Brienne.
The situation has recently changed. In 1992 the Minister of Defense, Pierre Joxe, reorganized and strengthened the

Délégation aux Etudes Générales with top-flight civilian and military security analysts and renamed it the Délégation
aux Affairs Stratégique (DAS). This reorganization better prepared him when he and his ministry sallied forth into the
interagency policy-formulation process.[14] Moreover, the elevation of Admiral Jacques Lanxade to Chief of Staff of
the armed forces, the French experience in the Gulf War, and the deployment of sizable numbers of French forces to
the former Yugoslavia have increased dramatically the Ministry's influence in the interagency formulation of national
strategy and security policy. In short, many in the French government, and particularly within the security policy
apparatus, recognize that the new European security environment requires input from the Hôtel de Brienne in the
policymaking process.
Office of the Prime Minister (Hôtel Matignon). Given the President of the Republic's domaine réservé in defense
and security policy, the Prime Minister traditionally has wielded little power in these areas. However, with the return
to power of the conservatives (Rassemblement pour la Répubique--RPR, headed by Jacques Chirac, and the Union
pour la Démocratie Française--UDF, led by former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing), France confronted a second
instance of government divided between a president of a party different from the majority party in parliament. The first
period of such cohabitation occurred when Jacques Chirac--President Mitterrand's arch political enemy--was Prime
Minister from 1986 to 1988.[15] Because of that tumultuous experience, Mitterrand has gone out of his way to ensure
a solid working relationship with the current Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur,[16] a key member of Chirac's RPR.
Evidence of the lengths to which Mitterrand will go to ensure the success of this working relationship with Balladur
can be found in the recent release of a Defense White Paper, the first such document published since 1972.[17] French
initiatives seeking to end the Yugoslav civil war and the presence of large numbers of French troops there have also
necessitated Balladur's support and input into the policymaking process.[18] This cooperative atmosphere (which, not
insignificantly, undermines Chirac's chances in the April 1995 presidential elections) has produced a unique situation
in which the Prime Minister has regularly been brought into the policymaking circle by the opposition. Despite his
early claim that he would not challenge Mitterrand, Balladur has used the opportunity to encroach on the President's
security prerogatives and "to gather the strategic community around the prime minister" in preparation for his own run
for the presidency in 1995.[19] As result of the Prime Minister's new influence, the domaine réservé is now sometimes
referred to as a domaine partagé (shared domain).[20]
General Secretariat of National Defense (Secretariat General de la Défense Nationale--SGDN). Organizationally
under the Prime Minister, the SGDN is not a decisionmaking body, but rather a coordinating agency whose principal
activities include managing national intelligence efforts and developing net assessments. SGDN is also the principal
coordinating agency for crisis management. Since the 1992 establishment of the Délégation aux Affairs Stratégique,
the SGDN has lost some influence, particularly in developing net assessments.
The National Assembly and the Senate (Assemblée nationale and Sénat). Apart from providing budgetary input as
the important long-term defense program is being developed, these legislative bodies exert little influence on national
strategy and security policy. The French Parliament lacks the resources and the extensive organizational support (such
as the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office) that allow the US Congress to influence
significantly the formulation of defense and security policy. Notwithstanding the activities of their respective
legislative committees, and given the power of the Elysée in defense and security policy, the legislature is relatively
unimportant in formulating national defense and security policy.
When attempting to decipher French policy and attitudes toward NATO, one should never forget that their basis is
largely founded on domestic, as opposed to external, political rationales.[21] And although there is a large security
policymaking community in the French government, key decisions on policy issues are made by the President, in close
collaboration with the Foreign Office. Given the high esteem in which the French public continues to hold General de
Gaulle, successive Presidents have been loath to veer far from the tenets of Gaullist defense and security policy.[22]
Public discord between Mitterrand and Balladur over Gaullist security and defense principles would remove one of the
few remaining bipartisan agreements in French domestic politics. Bipartisan announcements notwithstanding, basic
policy differences occasionally produce conflicting signals from the French government.
Strains also exist within the policymaking bureaucracies. For example, under the 5th Republic there have always been
differences between the Elysée and the Matignon over the respective roles of the President and the Prime Minister in

the formulation and conduct of security policy. While this has been true even when both offices have been occupied by
members of the same political party, it has been exacerbated during the two periods of cohabitation.[23]
Other domestic political issues continue to shape French policy toward NATO. Most obvious are the differences
between the Socialists and their opponents on the right, the RPR and the UDF. Equally important is the jockeying for
position for the upcoming presidential election within the right--Giscard (UDF) and Chirac (RPR)--as well as within
the RPR (Chirac vs. Balladur). The result of all these competing and conflicting interactions is that they confuse
French policymaking and thus confound outside observers of French security policy.
Changes in French NATO Policy
The year 1991 was a difficult one for French officials. According to David Yost, the Gulf War had a chilling effect
upon many of the military and political assumptions undergirding French strategy and security policy.[24] The French
experience during the Gulf crisis largely explains the emergence of a dual, not always consistent, French approach to
NATO. Clinging to the old axiom that the maintenance of bilateral security ties with the United States should be dealt
with separately from NATO issues, some French officials--particularly then-Foreign Minister Roland Dumas--argued
that the United States, the sole remaining superpower, needed to be balanced by an independent and more deeply
integrated European Community.[25] Hence, France opposed efforts to transform NATO from a purely collective
defense organization to a body that could participate in collective security missions (e.g., peacekeeping operations)
under Article IV of the NATO Treaty.[26] The French government offered an alternative that favored a stronger and
revitalized European Union (vice the Atlantic Community) which eventually would undertake collective security
responsibilities.[27] These French initiatives, sponsored by the Foreign Minister, failed.
During this same period President Mitterrand and Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe also began quietly reassessing and
changing French policy toward NATO. Nine months after NATO started examining its strategy, Joxe surprised many
analysts by announcing that France would participate in the Alliance's ongoing strategy review.[28] Given that the
divisive debates that led up to the Alliance's adoption of the strategy of Flexible Response in 1966 contributed
significantly to de Gaulle's decision to leave NATO, this move by the President and his Defense Minister had both
substantive and symbolic meaning. France's subsequent endorsement of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept at the
November 1991 Rome Summit further underscored the shift in French policy. At the same time, Paris continued to
oppose French participation in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), much to Joxe's disappointment,[29] and
remains suspicious of the lack of sufficient political control over the SACEUR.
Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, the most significant step in France's policy evolution was the
French decision at the Oslo NATO foreign ministers meeting, in June 1992, to underwrite NATO participation in
Article IV peacekeeping missions under the political auspices of the United Nations and the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.[30] Equally important, the French are participating under NATO aegis in missions such as
Operation Deny Flight and Sharp Guard.[31]
These decisions have had three key effects. First, by agreeing to these new missions for the Alliance, France retreated
from its long-held view that NATO should not be employed for missions other than the collective defense of its
members.[32] Second, since April 1993, the Chief of the French Military Mission to the NATO Military Committee
has participated in Military Committee discussions dealing with "peacekeeping,"[33] however broadly defined.[34]
Third, the recent White Paper leaves the door open for the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the armed forces
to participate in the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, on a case-by-case basis, as decided by the
President and Prime Minister.[35]
There are several reasons for these changes in French policy. The French have recognized that the dramatic changes in
the European security environment have made NATO more important, not less so as they originally perceived.[36]
Their experience with the Western European Union and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, for example, have
reinforced for the French the importance of NATO.
This may be the case particularly in peace operations, which appears to be the most likely venue in which French
forces might be employed. Consequently, the French have insisted on increasing the power and importance of the
Military Committee in Article IV missions, at the expense of the Major NATO Commands. This has resulted in the

Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee attending its meetings as a participant, rather than as
an observer, for the first time since France left the integrated command structure in 1966.
Participation in the Military Committee is certainly more politically palatable within France than allowing the Minister
of Defense to attend DPC meetings, because such a symbolic and substantive move would enhance the power and
prestige of the defense ministry at the expense of the foreign office. Moreover, if the Minister of Defense attended
such meetings, other DPC members might demand that France participate fully in the defense planning process, a
policy change the French are unlikely to make any time soon.[37]
Just as the French military has returned to high-level defense discussions in NATO, so, too, the French military now
participates in a standing multinational structure in peacetime. Granted, the French have continued as nonintegrated
participants in specific NATO functions, such as the integrated air defense systems and certain logistics and
infrastructure activities. And agreements to allow cooperation in a crisis between French forces and NATO military
commands (e.g., agreements with SACEUR and CINCENT) have existed since 1967.[38] New initiatives, however,
indicate the extent of change in French policy.
The first example concerns command and control of the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps, a joint initiative of President
Mitterrand and German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, emerged from the fall 1991 Franco-German Summit at La
Rochelle.[39] The Eurocorps, as proposed, was to be based on an existing Franco-German brigade and provide the
foundation for a European Security and Defense Identity. Although the Bush Administration and others in the Alliance
strenuously opposed the initiative as another French assault on NATO,[40] the Germans touted the Eurocorps as a
means of easing French participation into Alliance military structures.[41] The German view appeared vindicated
when, according to press reports, on 21 January 1993 an agreement signed by the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr,
General Klaus Naumann; then-SACEUR, General John Shalikashvili; and Admiral Lanxade placed the Eurocorps
under the operational command (vice control) of the SACEUR for the conduct of NATO missions.[42] Thus, not only
are French forces assigned to the Eurocorps anchored within a multinational structure, but French forces could be
placed under the command of the SACEUR for wartime operations should signatory nations so decide, with all the
peacetime implications this entails.[43]
The issues of NATO command and control and French forces in Article IV collective security missions continued
their evolution when, at the January 1994 NATO Summit, France agreed to US initiatives for the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) and the Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF).[44] While Paris agreed in principle to both concepts,
implementation of the initiatives has not been without expressions of French reluctance. For example, Paris insisted
that the Planning Coordination Cell (the nerve center of PfP), while located at SHAPE in Mons, could not be under the
control of SACEUR, but would be answerable to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Additionally, Paris
manifested its long-held suspicions of the SACEUR during discussions concerning the development of the terms of
reference for C/JTF.[45] While the French position was perhaps not precisely what the United States and other
Alliance countries would have preferred, the mere fact that Paris did not veto these concepts marks a significant change
in French policy.[46]
A final notable change in French policy toward NATO relates to weapons of mass destruction. In recognition of the
importance of this issue and the absolute need to coordinate related Western efforts, the French have agreed to
participate in the Alliance's political and defense committees dealing with nonproliferation.[47] Within the defense
committee, France not only participates in the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, but cochairs the group with the
United States.[48] Paris's participation in this group is one of the few times France has joined in a defense committee
project since 1966. Clearly, the potential magnitude of the proliferation problem and the overriding need to coordinate
efforts with its allies have prompted this important change in French policy.
Implementing French NATO Policy
If it is important to know how French policy toward NATO has changed, it is equally important to understand the
manner in which this change in policy has been carried out. Understanding the process of change will identify sources
of new problems; it may also provide key indicators of the probability of further change, as well as the durability of
recent French initiatives in NATO.

There are two impediments to recognizing change in French policy toward NATO. First, it seems that whenever senior
French officials from the Prime Minister's office or the Ministry of Defense announce an apparent policy change, these
declarations are almost inevitably followed by denials from the President's office or the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.[49] Second, in view of past French policy and attitudes toward the Alliance, some observers and officials find
it difficult to accept that Paris has changed its NATO policy. This has been the case not only in a historical sense
(during the Cold War) but was reinforced by French rhetoric and actions during 1989-92 as the Alliance developed its
new strategy and significantly reduced its force structures.
The choice of Admiral Jacques Lanxade as the primary agent of change has been one of the more remarkable aspects
of France's policy toward NATO. Mitterrand chose a military official for this task, as opposed to the Foreign Minister
or a professional diplomat, for two reasons. First, as the President's Chief of Military Staff in the Elysée during the
Gulf War, Lanxade was well placed to coordinate France's involvement in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, especially
in sensitive political discussions with French allies, and particularly with the United States. Following the end of
hostilities in April 1991, Admiral Lanxade became Chief of Staff of the armed forces. Because he enjoys Mitterrand's
confidence, he has been able to restructure the French armed forces, paying particular attention to joint and combined
operations. This reorganization and emphasis on joint issues, in turn, supports Mitterrand's new policy of enhanced
selectivity with NATO.
Second, as noted earlier, internal French politics helped drive Lanxade's selection for this task. Since the start of the
second period of cohabitation, the issue of NATO has taken on an interesting partisan flavor, beyond its normal levels.
Many currently assume that the race in the forthcoming French presidential elections is between Jacques Chirac (the
leader of the RPR and mayor of Paris) and RPR Prime Minister Balladur (a previous Chirac supporter). Within this
unusual intraparty struggle, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé supports Chirac, while Minister of Defense François Léotard
supports Balladur.
As a result of this partisan political morass, Lanxade is the one individual capable of operating above partisan politics
while still maintaining close relations with all the major political actors, particularly President Mitterrand. Indeed,
French officials readily--albeit privately--acknowledge that Lanxade is probably the most influential and powerful
official in the area of defense policymaking and implementation that France has seen in many years.[50]
Conclusion
While the preceding analysis indicates that French policy toward NATO appears to have changed, the depth of that
change remains open to question: Do the issues described above constitute a fundamental change in policy, or has
policy remained relatively fixed while the French pursue new means to their long-established ends? Even if French
policy has changed, have attitudes in key elements of the French policy bureaucracy altered sufficiently to carry out
the change, or will bureaucratic foot-dragging forestall full-scale implementation?
On balance, it should be clear that long-standing French policies toward the Alliance have changed. Before asserting
that France has "returned" to the Alliance, however, one must understand that Mitterrand's reconsideration of France's
relationship with NATO will not result in a return to status quo ante 1966.[51] Indeed, French policymakers--even
those who most strongly support NATO--continue to pronounce that France will not return to the Alliance's integrated
military structure.[52] Nor do the developments constitute a rapprochement, as suggested by one French journal.[53]
Simply put, apparently irreconcilable differences remain between France and NATO. The determined independence of
the French nuclear deterrent and strategy, and the French phobia about political oversight of NATO military authorities
appear unlikely to be changed regardless of who wins the 1995 presidential election. A reconciliation does not a
marriage remake.
While France is drawing closer to NATO, the Alliance should expect France to continue to pursue a policy of NATO à
la carte. Certainly, the menu of French choices appears to be expanding, but the Alliance should expect the French to
opt only for the perquisites that support French national interests, and to defer selections that would add new--and
costly--responsibilities: contributions to infrastructure funding; adherence to NATO planning requirements; meeting
NATO training and readiness standards; and supporting NATO standardization, rationalization, and interoperability
requirements.

If one accepts the proposition that French policy toward NATO has changed, it is advisable to examine the nature and
extent of these changes. The fact that the Quai, traditionally the center of French diplomacy and security policy
formulation, effectively has been marginalized in the process--and by the Chief of Staff of the armed forces no less-does not bode well for long-term continuity of policy developed and supported by Admiral Lanxade. Simply put, once
Mitterrand and Lanxade pass from the scene (as Mitterrand soon will, with Lanxade likely to follow quickly
thereafter), will their successors continue these policies or will the Quai reassert its traditional opposition to French
participation in the military structure of the Alliance?
Encouragingly, Balladur, a strong candidate for the presidency, favors this fresh approach to NATO, as evinced in the
White Paper. However, whether Balladur, Chirac, or Giscard d'Estaing wins the election, the new President may find it
difficult to stray far from the course charted by Mitterrand. Given the political and security situation in Europe, there
simply is little other choice.[54]
Thus, even with a surface change in policy, an understanding of the deeper currents of French attitudes toward these
changes, particularly within the policy bureaucracy, takes on added importance. Given the past attitude toward NATO
by the Quai (as well as by some officials in the Elysée), the absence of strong pressure from the President may allow
recidivist officials in the Quai and Elysée to retard, if not sabotage, improvements in relations with NATO. That the
Minister of Defense continues to be proscribed from attending NATO DPC meetings (much to the displeasure of
Minister of Defense Léotard) underscores the continued institutional power the Foreign Office enjoys over the Defense
Minister.[55] And disaffected officials need not openly assault policy to kill it; they can simply let it wither and die
from neglect. So while Paris can be expected to support some new NATO initiatives and draw closer to the Alliance,
one should also expect standard, time-worn rationales to be trotted out in opposition to others. Despite this qualified
reconciliation, therefore, France will continue to befuddle NATO and remain a source of frustration within the
Alliance.
So, while French policy toward NATO has changed, attitudes in critical parts of the French government remain
unrepentant, largely for bureaucratic and domestic political reasons. Limited change, French demands that even these
circumscribed revisions occur on French terms, and residual attitudes in key segments of the French policy
bureaucracy emphasize the fact that in effect, if not in principle, France continues to follow a policy of enhanced
selectivity when dealing with NATO, which could create as many problems as it solves.
Such an approach should not come as a surprise. Nations are expected to act in their own national interests and pursue
policies that further those interests. To assume otherwise is imprudent. But recent French initiatives should be viewed
positively. These initial, hesitant steps may eventually lead to fuller French participation in the Alliance; the United
States and other NATO partners should encourage France to return to the fold.
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